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Abstract: This paper outlines the New Consensus Macroeconomics, and discusses
three important aspects closely related to it: economic policy implications for
both monetary and fiscal policies; we deal with the natural rate of interest from
a number of perspectives, but most crucially we discuss how this concept is of
central importance to the New Consensus Macroeconomics; we also discuss
some of the issues and problems surrounding natural rate of interest, including
what it is meant to represent, issues of uniqueness and what happens if the rate
of interest is not equal to the natural rate. The central role of the Phillips curve
in the New Consensus Macroeconomics and the control of inflation is another
aspect we deal with in this contribution. We offer a critique of the new Keynesian
Phillips curve, a critical focus of the New Consensus Macroeconomics.
Keywords: New Consensus in Macroeconomics, Monetary Policy, Natural
Rate Of Interest, New Phillips Curve.
Resumo: O artigo apresente o Novo Consenso Macroeconômico e discute
trŒs importantes aspectos relacionados a ele: as implicaçıes de políticas fiscal e
monetÆria; a importância do conceito de taxa natural de juros para o Novo Con-
senso Macroeconômico; e as conseqüŒncias quando a taxa de juros difere da taxa
natural de juros. Ademais, o papel central da curva de Phillips no Novo Consenso
Macroeconômico e o controle da inflaçªo sªo outros aspectos a serem analisados.
Nesse sentido, o artigo apresenta a crítica da curva de curva de Phillips novo
keynesiana ao foco central do Novo Consenso Macroeconômico.
Palavras-chave: Novo Consenso Macroeconômico, Política MonetÆria, Taxa
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1 Introduction
A New Consensus in Macroeconomics (NCM in short) has emerged
over the past decade or so, which has become highly influential in
terms of current macroeconomics thinking and of macroeconomic
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policy, especially monetary policy. The NCM is now firmly established
amongst both academia and economic policy circles. It is also true
to say that it draws heavily on the so-called new Keynesian economics
(see MEYER, 2001, for a introduction, WOODFORD, 2003, for very
detailed elaboration albeit using the term neo-WICKSELLIAN and the
Bank of England, 2005, for a model along NCM lines in the context of
building a macro-economic model).
Monetary policy came to the fore from the 1970s onwards as the
major component of macroeconomic policy and directed towards the
control of inflation driven by the doctrine of monetarism. Monetarism
viewed money as exogenous and the cause of inflation, and the control
of the money supply became the monetary policy instrument. In
contrast, the NCM treats money as endogenous and the policy rate of
interest is used as the monetary policy instrument. But the view
remains that monetary policy is the policy of choice for the control
of inflation. The reason for the emergence of NCM as a different
paradigm from the monetarist tradition is the well-known one that
the experiments with money supply targeting were a cascading disaster
both the US and the UK, and elsewhere, in the late 1970s/early 1980s.
Monetarism, following Friedman (1968), incorporated the Phillips
curve notion whereby there is a short-run trade-off between inflation
and unemployment but that in the long-run (which may be reached
rather quickly) when expectations of inflation are fulfilled the Phillips
curve is vertical at the natural rate of unemployment. The Phillips curve
continues to play a central role in the NCM providing the mechanism
whereby variations in demand impact on inflation and also involving
a supply-side equilibrium which, it is asserted, cannot be influenced
by the path of demand.
This paper begins by outlining the NCM with the central intention
of considering whether it provides a reliable guide on which to base
macroeconomic policy. In doing so we focus on two crucial features of
the NCM, namely the idea of a natural rate of interest (following WICK-
SELL, 1898) which is an equilibrium rate in the sense of ensuring
equality between savings and investment at full employment and
being consistent with a constant rate of inflation, and the Phillips
curve with a short-run relationship between inflation and the level
of economic activity but a long-run position equivalent to the supply-
side equilibrium.
2 The NCM formulation
The NCM can be viewed as based on a form of inter-temporal
general equilibrium as in, notably, Woodford (2003). But it can be
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well represented in terms of a few key equations (in part because of
the heavy use of the notion of the representative economic agent),
and these equations provide a good guide to the NCM particularly
when attention is paid to the underlying rationale for each of the
equations. We present here, following Meyer, 2001, a three-equation
version as follows:1
Yg t = a0 + a1 Y
g
t-1 + a2 Et (Y
g
t+1)  a3 [Rt  Et (pt+1)] + s1        (1)
pt = b1Y
g
t + b2pt-1 + b3Et (pt+1) + s2                                    (2)
Rt = RR* + Et (pt+1) + c1Y
g
t-1 + c2 (pt-1  p
T) + c3 Rt-1         (3)
with b2 + b3 = 1; where Y
g is the output gap, R is nominal rate of
interest, p is rate of inflation, pT is inflation rate target, RR* is the
equilibrium real rate of interest (equivalent to the natural rate of
interest; see below), that is the rate of interest consistent with zero
output gap which implies from equation (2), a constant rate of inflation;
si (with i = 1, 2) represents stochastic shocks, and Et refers to
expectations held at time t.
Equation (1) can be viewed as the equivalent of an IS curve and
represents the demand side of the economy with the current output
gap determined by past and expected future output gap and the real
rate of interest. This equation is derived from optimisation of expected
life-time utility subject to a budget constraint (see, for example,
BLANCHARD; FISCHER, 1989, Chapter 2). Households and firms
have perfect foresight, and know the current and future values of wages
and rental rates. A condition, sometimes known as a non-Ponzi game
(NPG) condition is imposed which prevents families from choosing
such a path [with higher and higher levels of borrowing], with an
exploding debt relative to the size of the family. At the same time we do
not want to impose a condition that rules out temporary indebtedness.
A natural condition is to require that family debt not increase
asymptotically faster than the interest rate (BLANCHARD; FISCHER,
1989, p. 49). Three features of this approach should be noted. First,
the no-Ponzi game condition leads to the implication that lifetime
consumption is equal to lifetime income (each suitably discounted). At
the individual level, this comes from a combination of a non-satiation
assumption along with a no final debt condition. Second, the income
of the individual depends on labour supply at the given wage and of
capital, and the implicit assumption that the individual is able to
1 We rely heavily on previous contributions in terms of explaining NCM. See, for instance,
Arestis and Sawyer (2005, 2008) and Sawyer (2008). Arestis (2007) extends the NCM
analysis to the open economy case by utilising six equations.
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supply their labour. There is a full employment assumption. The combi-
nation of these two features means that at the aggregate level there is
the equivalent of Says Law: potential supply (of labour) leads to actual
supply of labour, and the resulting income is fully spent. Third, the
consumption decision is made at the level of the household or family
under perfect foresight. We can then observe that objections made be
raised to the notion of intertemporal optimisation along the lines of
unrealism in terms of the information on the future levels of income,
interest rates etc. Which are required, and the computational require-
ments to solve the optimisation problem. There is no consideration
given to uncertainty about the future, to learning and the change in
household membership. A certain (or certainty equivalent) future is
postulated. Significantly there is little room for learning in this process.
A further complication arises from whether the optimisation is carried
out at the individual level or the household level. If the decision is at
the individual level, then some consideration should be given to
income sharing within a household. If the decision is presented as
being made at the household level then there should be some
recognition of changing household composition  children grow
up, household split etc.
Equation (2) is a Phillips curve with inflation based on current
output gap and past and future inflation. As Gordon (1997, p. 17)
remarked (though not in the context of the NCM), in the long run
inflation is always and everywhere an excess nominal GDP pheno-
menon. Supply shocks will come and go. What remains to sustain long-
run inflation is steady growth of nominal GDP in excess of the growth
of natural or potential real output. The Phillips curve underlies the
NCM approach to monetary policy in two senses. First, the use of
interest rates to target inflation draws on the linkage: interest rate 
aggregate demand  economic activity  inflation, and the Phillips
curve is the final link in that chain. The sole use of monetary policy in
the form of interest rates to target the rate of inflation would be difficult
to justify without that final link in the chain. Second, the notion of the
trade-off between inflation and unemployment has been used to argue
the case for independence of central banks on the grounds that politi-
cians are tempted to stimulate the economy to reduce unemployment
without regard for the longer-term inflationary consequences.
Equation (3) is a monetary policy-operating rule (of the Taylors
rule form; see TAYLOR, 1993) with the nominal interest rate based
on expected inflation, output gap, and deviation of inflation from
target as well as the equilibrium real rate of interest. The lagged
interest rate represents interest rate smoothing undertaken by the
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monetary authorities (see, for example, MCCALLUM, 2001).2  Equation
(3) clearly endogenises the setting of interest rate by the Central Bank
and does so along the lines of Taylors rule (TAYLOR, 1993). The
significance of the use of Taylors rule is twofold. First, it treats the
setting of interest rates as a domestic matter without direct reference
to international considerations such as the exchange rate and interest
rates elsewhere in the world, and those international considerations
would only enter Taylors rule through effects on the domestic
variables of output gap and inflation rate. Second, the interest rate is
adjusted in response to the output gap (and to the rate of inflation
which in turn is modelled to depend on the output gap). A zero output
gap is consistent with constant inflation, as can be seen from equation
(2). Equation (3) then implies a nominal rate of interest which
translates into a real rate equal to the equilibrium rate RR*, which
is consistent with zero output gap and constant inflation. From
equation (1), the value of RR* would need to be a0/a3. Provided that
the Central Bank has an accurate estimate of RR* then it appears that
the economy can be guided to an equilibrium of the form of a zero
output gap and constant inflation (at an interest rate equal to the pre
set target). In this case, equation (1) indicates that aggregate demand
is at a level that is consistent with a zero output gap. In a private
sector economy, this would imply that the real interest rate RR* brings
equality between (ex ante) savings and investment. The equilibrium
rate of interest corresponds to the Wicksellian natural rate of interest,
which equates savings and investment at a supply-side equilibrium
level of income.
In effect, the model portrays an economy in which the interest
rate can be adjusted to secure equilibrium in terms of a zero output
gap and a balance between aggregate demand and aggregate supply
(alternatively between planned savings and planned investment).
Equation (1) relates the output gap from a demand perspective to
expected future output gap, and the rate of interest. First, though,
note that the emphasis is on the output gap that is the gap between
actual level of output and the normal or trend rate of output. It is
assumed that the normal or trend rate of output is set on the supply-
side of the economy. In effect this trend rate of output is a function
2 A fourth equation can be added, which relates the stock of money to demand for money
variables such as income, prices and the rate of interest, which would reinforce the
endogenous money nature of this approach with the stock of money being demand
determined. Clearly, though, such an equation would be superfluous in that the stock of
money thereby determined is akin to a residual and does not feed back to affect other
variables in the model.
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(via a production function) of the factor inputs of labour, capital etc...
Second, the real rate of interest is included, and this reflects the role
of a comparison between present consumption and future consumption
in terms of discounting the future.
There are a number of features of the NCM which should be
drawn out as being particularly relevant for the analysis of monetary
and fiscal policy. These are:
(I) the perfect capital market assumption: specifically the absence of
credit rationing (which would mean that some individuals were credit
constrained) and the assumption of a single interest rate. This would
mean that the only effect of monetary policy would be a price effect
as the rate of interest is changed. The parts of the transmission me-
chanism of monetary policy, which involve credit rationing and
changes in the non-price terms on which credit is supplied would
be excluded by assumption.
(II) there is no mention of banks in this analysis. It has been noted
that in the major text of Woodford (2003) banks make no appearance
in the index (GOODHART, 2004). Since banks and their decisions
play a considerably significant role in the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy, and further that decisions by banks as to whether
or not to grant credit plays a major role in the expansion of the eco-
nomy (in the sense that a failure of banks to supply credit would
imply that expansion of expenditure cannot occur), there is a dis-
juncture between this analysis and the role of monetary policy.
(III) the role for investment. The basic analysis (WOODFORD, 2003,
Chapter 4) is undertaken for households optimising their utility
function in terms of the time path of consumption.3 Investment can
then be introduced in terms of the expansion of the capital stock,
which is required to underpin the growth of income. In effect the
future path of the economy is mapped out, and consequently the
time path of the capital stock. Investment ensures the adjustment of
the capital stock to that predetermined time path. There is then by
assumption no impact of the path of the economy on the capital stock.
There is not what we may term an independent investment function
in the sense of arising from firms decisions taken in the light of profit
and growth opportunities, separated from savings decisions of
households.
3 One of the more obvious omissions in the basic neo-Wicksellian model developed in
Chapter 4 is the absence of any effect of variations in private spending upon the economys
productive capacity and hence upon supply costs in subsequent periods (WOODFORD,
2003, p. 352).
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3 The natural rate of interest and macroeconomic policy
The natural rate of interest plays a crucial role in the NCM. In terms
of the three equations above, it is clear that a rate of interest in real
terms equal to the natural rate of interest secures output at the supply
equilibrium level (zero output gap) consistent with constant inflation.
Another way of putting this result is to say that when the real rate of
interest is equal to the natural rate, then there is no problem of
deficient (or indeed excessive) aggregate demand.
This bold assertion hides many things, which we think are parti-
cularly pertinent for macroeconomic policy considerations.
First, it is noteworthy that the model is set up in terms of the
rate of interest, which is identified with the policy rate of interest (which
is adjusted according to equation (3)). The implicit assumptions here
are that the interest rates (e.g. on loans), which are relevant for decision
makers (over investment and savings) move in line with the policy
rate of interest, and that it is the policy rate which is exogenous as far
as the private sector is concerned, albeit that it is varied by the Cen-
tral Bank in accordance with deviations of inflation from target and the
output gap. It is also implicitly assumed that decisions on investment
(and indeed consumption) are made in response to the cost of finance
(that is the rate of interest) with no allowance for credit rationing and
the like.
Second, the policy interest rate is the adjustment tool by which the
economy moves towards equilibrium (zero output gap and constant
rate of inflation). But the adjustment is undertaken by the Central
Bank, and depends on the Central Bank following an appropriate
decision rule. Equation (3) appears as such a decision rule but even
so depends on knowledge of the natural rate of interest, an issue to
which we return below.
Third, fiscal policy is ruled out by omission. The three-equation
model outlined above appears to offer little opportunity for fiscal
policy. It would be possible to interpret the coefficient a0 in equation
(1) as a shift variable reflecting the fiscal stance. It would, of course,
be the case that the equilibrium level of output is unaffected by fiscal
policy. If the fiscal stance were changed, this would be reflected in a
change in a0, the implication from this model is that the natural rate
of interest (which can be solved out as a0/a3) would also change so as
to leave the equilibrium level of aggregate demand unchanged and
compatible with the equilibrium level of output. Fiscal policy could
be compared in terms of its stabilising properties with monetary policy
by the use of a fiscal policy Taylors rule whereby the fiscal stance
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changes in response to deviations of inflation from its target and output
from its equilibrium level. Equation (3) is asserted to reflect actual
practice, even though fiscal policy may be adjudged more powerful.
However, there is a strong sense in which fiscal policy is deemed
impotent in this approach by construction. As indicated above, there
is the idea of an intertemporal budget constraint at the level of the
individual, and then by construction at the level of the private sector.
Under this budget constraint, there is an essential equality between
income and expenditure and savings and investment. There is then
a corresponding government budget constraint. This takes the form
of the governments intertemporal budget constraint It states that
the current level of debt must be equal to the present discounted value of
primary surpluses. If the government is currently a net debtor, it must
intend to run primary surpluses at some time in the future (BLANCHARD;
FISCHER, 1989, p. 127, emphasis in original).
This approach nullifies any requirement (or effect) of fiscal policy
for two interrelated reasons. First, it is an accounting requirement that
the private sector surplus plus the public sector surplus sum to zero (in
the context of a closed economy). Hence, if the private sector is, over
time, constrained to have a balanced budget along the full employment
path, then so must the public sector. But since the private sector is
spending all its income, full employment is assured and there is no
space for a public sector budget deficit. Second, there is Ricardian
equivalence so far as the households are concerned. Hence any
fiscal stimulus by government would be completely offset by the
response of the private sector.
Fourth, by extension from the previous point, any variations in the
fiscal stance (and indeed variations in factors influencing investment,
and in an open economy context, variations in foreign demand)
would lead to a variation in the natural rate of interest. The real
interest rate is at an equilibrium level of RR*, which can be seen to
be equal to a0/a3. This equilibrium rate is often seen to correspond
to what is called the Wicksellian natural rate of interest. Wicksell
(1898) distinguished between the money rate of interest (as observed)
and the natural rate of interest, which was the interest rate that was
neutral to prices in the real market, and the interest rate at which
supply and demand in the real market was at equilibrium. The idea
that a0 in equation (1) would change with fiscal policy severely
undermines the concept of the natural rate of interest in two respects.
First, it becomes evident that the natural rate of interest would
depend on a key component of aggregate demand, namely fiscal
policy. Second, it destroys any notion of a unique natural rate.
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Although it is not self-evident from the model outlined above,
this natural rate of interest equates savings and investment and does
so at a zero output gap. This is implicitly assumed to be consistent
with the full employment of labour in that flexible real wages would
permit the labour market to clear with full employment compatible
with the zero output gap. Although the rate of interest is set by the
Central Bank, the loanable funds view of interest rate determination
is reinstated. This takes us back to a pre-Keynesian position (in the
The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money sense; GT in
short) as described by Keynes himself. In his Treatise on Money, Keynes
(1930, p. 139), states that Following Wicksell, it will be convenient
to call the rate of interest which would cause the second term of our
fundamental equation to be zero the natural rate of interest, and the
rate which actually prevails the market rate of interest. Thus the na-
tural rate of interest is the rate at which saving and the value of
investment are exactly balanced, so that the price level of output as
a whole (P) exactly corresponds to the money rate of the efficiency
earnings of the factors of production. Every departure of the market
rate from the natural rate tends, on the other hand, to set up a distur-
bance of the price level by causing the second term of the second
fundamental equation to depart from zero. We have, therefore,
something with which the ordinary quantity equation does not furnish
us, namely, a simple and direct explanation why a rise in the bank
rate tends, in so far as it modifies the effective rates of interest, to
depress price levels.
However, in GT, Keynes (1936) explicitly rejects the idea of a
unique natural rate of interest, and in effect argues that there is a
natural rate of interest corresponding to each level of effective demand,
which would bring savings and investment into balance. In my
Treatise on Money I defined what purported to be a unique rate of
interest, which I called the natural rate of interest  namely, the rate
of interest which, in the terminology of my Treatise, preserved equality
between the rate of saving (as there defined) and the rate of
investment... I had, however, overlooked the fact that in any given
society there is, on this definition, a different natural rate of interest
for each hypothetical level of employment. And, similarly, for every
rate of interest there is a level of employment for which the rate is
the natural rate, in the sense that the system will be in equilibrium
with that rate of interest and that level of employment. Thus it was a
mistake to speak of the natural rate of interest or to suggest that the
above definition would yield a unique value for the rate of interest
irrespective of the level of employment. I had not then understood
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that, in certain conditions, the system could be in equilibrium with
less than full employment (KEYNES, 1936, p. 242-243).
It is also the case that a shift in the state of confidence and expecta-
tions leading to a shift in the investment schedule would lead to a
shift in the natural rate of interest. Keynes (1936, p. 243-244) went on
to argue that If there is any such rate of interest, which is unique
and significant, it must be the rate which we might term the neutral
rate of interest, namely, the natural rate in the above sense which is
consistent with full employment, given the other parameters of the
system; though this rate might be better described, perhaps, as the
optimum rate The above gives us, once again, the answer to the
question as to what tacit assumption is required to make sense of the
classical theory of the rate of interest. This theory assumes either that
the actual rate of interest is always equal to the neutral rate of interest
in the sense in which we have just defined the latter, or alternatively that
the actual rate of interest is always equal to the rate of interest which
will maintain employment at some specified constant level. If the
traditional theory is thus interpreted, there is little or nothing in its
practical conclusions to which we need take exception. The classical
theory assumes that the banking authority or natural forces cause the
market-rate of interest to satisfy one or other of the above conditions.
The NCM model portrays an economy in which the interest rate
can be adjusted to secure equilibrium in terms of a zero output gap
and a balance between aggregate demand and aggregate supply
(alternatively between planned savings and planned investment).
There are (at least) six factors that may prevent this from coming about,
and which would upset the conclusion that interest rate policy can guide
the economy to equilibrium with demand and supply in balance
and inflation on target.
The first is that the equilibrium rate of interest is either negative
or positive but so low as to be unattainable.4  In terms of the equations
given above this would correspond to the real rate of interest given
by a0/a3 being low or negative. This would be equivalent to saying
that the savings and investment schedules do not intersect in the
positive range of interest rates. The aggregate demand equation (1)
above clearly assumes that aggregate demand, and presumably
investment, is interest rate sensitive (such that a3 is greater than zero)
4 This discussion is in terms of the Central Bank rate. It is assumed that the rate of interest on
loans is above the Central Bank rate, and that it is the rate of interest on loans, which is
relevant for investment decisions. Given the risks for banks involved in extending loans, it
can be assumed that there is a minimum level below which banks would not go in terms of
the loan rate.
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and that there is a substantial autonomous component of demand
(otherwise a0 would be non-positive).
Second, and not unrelated to the previous point, interest rates may
have very little effect on the levels of investment and savings and hence
variations in the rate of interest would be ineffectual in reconciling
intended savings and investment. The theoretical and empirical argu-
ments on the ambiguity of the sign of the relationship between savings
and the rate of interest are well known. The empirical literature on invest-
ment has often cast doubt on the impact of interest rates on investment
and stressed the roles of profitability and capacity utilisation.
Third, the linkage from the key discount rate set by the Central
Bank and the interest rates, which influence economic decisions,
may be rather loose and uncertain. For example, the long-term rate of
interest may be viewed as relevant for long-term investment decisions,
and the response of the long-term rate of interest to changes in the key
discount rate may be relatively slight and may vary over time. The banks
could respond to a change in the discount rate by a combination of
changes in the interest rate on loans and changes in the credit stan-
dards, which they set. Hence, the impact of a change in the discount
rate on interest-sensitive spending decisions depends on the decisions
of banks and other financial institutions.
Fourth, the equilibrium rate of interest has been determined in
light of domestic considerations only, and may not be compatible
with interest rates in the rest of the world or have severe implications
for the capital account balance.5
Fifth, the Central Bank cannot calculate and attain the equili-
brium rate of interest through reasons of lack of information, it being
a moving target. It can be seen in the equations given above that the
equilibrium rate depends on a0/a3 and these are parameters, which
can and do vary over time. Mistakes may occur in the setting of interest
rates as the Central Bank has imperfect information on the equilibrium
real rate of interest RR* (assuming that such a rate does actually
exist), and may aim for a real rate of interest which is not equal to a0/
a3. Any shift in fiscal policy, in investors confidence or in world trade
conditions would be reflected in a change in a0, leading thereby to a
change in the equilibrium real rate of interest. This would, of course,
5 As Keynes (1930, p. 192) argued, the dilemma of modern banking is satisfactorily to
combine the two functions. As a purveyor of representative money, it is the duty of the
banking system to preserve the prescribed objective standard of money. As a purveyor of
loans on terms and conditions of a particular type, it is the duty of the system to adjust, to the
best of its ability, its supply of this type of lending to the demand for it at the equilibrium rate
of interest, i.e. at the natural rate.
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exacerbate the problems of securing information on the equilibrium
rate and exacerbate the chances of policy mistakes. Information on
the equilibrium rate is not exactly readily available, and indeed at
best can only be estimated with some lag and over a period when it
can be reasonably assumed the underlying parameters are stable. A
significant issue arises here, namely whether the Central Bank can
make systematic mistakes on its estimates of the natural rate, and in
particular does the Central Bank tend to overestimate the natural
rate. The interest rate set by the Central Bank will have an effect on
investment decisions, and a generally too high interest rate will lead
to lower investment and capital stock. In turn, the capital stock will
help determine the trend level of output, and a lower capital stock
could lead to a lower trend level of output. Sixth, the Central Bank
(or the government) may not wish to attain the equilibrium rate of
interest as defined above. In other words, the Central Bank does not
pursue a policy rule akin to Taylors rule.
Sixth, equation (1) and the reasoning, which lies behind it, has
two significant implications. First, it expresses output (relative to trend,
hence output gap) is equal to demand. In equilibrium the supply is
equal to demand, and equivalently (desired) savings equal to (desired)
investment. The natural rate of interest brings savings and invest-
ment into balance and in that sense could be seen as equivalent to
the loanable funds rate of interest. Second, out of equilibrium (that is
when the rate of interest is not equal to the natural rate) then there
is a difference between desired investment and desired savings. But the
actual level of investment and savings is equal to desired investment.
When the actual rate of interest is above (below) the natural rate, it is
expected that desired investment is less (more) than desired savings. So
even when desired savings is less than desired investment, the desired
level of investment occurs, and in effect there is forced savings. Contrary
to the argument that out of equilibrium the short side of the market
dominates (CLOWER, 1965) in this case investment is treated as
dominating. In one sense this can be readily explained: investment
expenditure is financed through bank loans, and provided banks are
willing to supply the necessary loans at the prevailing rate of interest,
the investment expenditure can take place. But it does run counter to
loanable funds notions, and also counter to the argument frequently
advanced in the financial repression literature that interest rate below
equilibrium would lead to low savings and thereby low investment.
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4 The new Keynesian Phillips curve approach
The New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC), a central feature of
the NCM, can be seen to have its origins in the staggered price setting
model of Calvo (1983). The key elements of this approach are as
follows.6  Each firm produces a differentiated product, faces a constant
price elasticity of demand curve for its product. In each period some
firms change price but others do not, and in each period a proportion
Æ of firms do not change price, and the probability of a firm changing
its price in the period in question is independent of whether it had
changed price in the preceding period. The aggregate price level
can then be constructed as a weighted average of lagged price level
and the optimal price set by those changing price. With the price
level (log form) denoted p and optimal price (again log form) p*, the
equation is:
(4)
The optimal price p* is derived from profit maximising calcula-
tions in a forward-looking context. The firm takes into account that
its marginal costs will change in the future and that it may or may not
change price in any specific period. These considerations lead to
the following:
(5)
where â is the subjective discount factor, YT and YT
n are output and
normal output respectively and º arises from the sensitivity of margi-
nal cost to output and the mark-up of price over marginal costs. The
output term comes in through marginal cost for as Woodford (2003,
p. 181) notes the appearance of the expected log real marginal cost
(i.e. the expected gap between log marginal cost and the log price
index) in the first order condition... also makes sense insofar as it is
this gap, rather than the level of real activity as such, that is directly
related to the incentives that suppliers have to adjust their prices. It
should specifically be noted that the relationship between marginal
cost and output is assumed to be a monotonic and positive one (the
output that is relevant as a measure of inflationary pressures should
6 This derivation is based on Woodford (2003, Section 2.1 p. 177-196 and p. 661-2). See, for
example, Gali and Gertler (1999) for a similar derivation albeit implicitly based on perfect
competition with price equal to marginal cost.
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be monotonically related to variations in the level of real marginal
costs). Often a Cobb-Douglas production function is assumed which
ensures a positive relationship between marginal cost and output.7
Manipulation of equations (4) and (5) then yields:
(6)
where
Equation (6) can, then, be iterated forward to yield:
(7)
There are some rather surprising implications, which come from
the NKPC. It has been noted (GALI; GERTLER, 1999, for example)
equation (7) implies that the current change in inflation should depend
negatively on the lagged output gap (with β ≈ 1, and the difference
between expected inflation and actual inflation a random error term).
Further, although β, being the discount factor is likely to be close to
unity, the NKPC strictly does not involve a vertical long-run Phillips
curve. A recent contribution has criticised the vertical view of the Phillips
curve. Karanasou et al. (2006, p. 36) show that the proposition of a
vertical Phillips curve can only be right under the implausible assumption
of symmetric backward and forward-looking elements in the price-
setting behaviour due to no time discounting. When intertemporal
asymmetry is introduced a long-run inflation-unemployment tradeoff
exists after all. A holistic approach is, then, needed that accounts for
the intimate dynamic relation between inflation and unemployment
(see, also, BATINI et al., 2005).
A further significant feature emerges from equation (7), namely
that the rate of inflation is the sum of expected future real variables,
and these variables can be anticipated to have a zero mean as they
refer to deviations of output from normal level. This appears to
suggest that inflation itself will always be close to zero. An alternative
interpretation is that variables have been expressed relative to a
steady state inflation rate, and hence ð would then be interpreted as
deviation of inflation from steady state rate, leaving the steady state
rate of inflation unexplained.
7 In the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function this equilibrium level of output clearly
would not correspond to any physical capacity output nor to a level of output at which
average costs are minimised. It could be taken as the level of output which firms would
choose to produce given relative prices.
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It can be readily seen from the above derivation that the assumption
of rising marginal costs is crucial to the derivation of equation (5).
The assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production function, which has
often been used in this context, may be questioned on grounds of its
empirical relevance (ROWTHORN, 1999).8  It is, of course, the case
that any positive monotonic relationship between marginal cost and
output would be sufficient in this context. However, the notion that
firms always operate where marginal costs are rising with output is
of dubious empirical relevance. For example, also relevant to the
interpretation of all the empirical work on price determination is the
fact that actual unit costs changes fall during booms and rise in
recessions (LAIDLER; PARKIN, 1975, p. 768). Downward (1999)
reports some 19 per cent of UK firms agreeing that costs increase
with output but 65 per cent agreeing that costs decrease with output.
Taylor (1998, p. 23) concludes that  it would be inaccurate and
misleading to build a model in which the average frequency of price
[or wage] adjustment is longer than one year.
The dismissal of the traditional U-shaped costs curves with a
range of declining unit costs and then range of increasing unit costs
in the context of an imperfect competition approach is surprising.
The notion of a pricing decision made by a firm (rather than dictated
by the market) is closely linked with imperfect competition, and
indeed the NKPC is based on firms producing differentiated products.
It is also possible that under conditions of imperfect competition firms
may well be operating along the declining portion of their cost cur-
ves. It then follows that for those firms where marginal costs and
output were negatively related, a NKPC would be derived in which
price inflation was negatively related to the level of output.
The influence, which the assumption on frequency of price change
has on the NKPC approach, can be seen from equation (6). In the
case where firms consider changing price every period, i.e. β = 0,
then it can be readily seen that equation (6) collapses as the coefficient
Œ on the deviation of output from normal goes to infinity. In the case
where no firms consider changing price, inflation would not depend
on the output gap (since the first term in that equation would have
zero coefficient) and inflation is solely driven by expected inflation
8 The CES production function has also been used. Harrison et al. (2005) elaborate on the use
of the CES production function as follows: The motivation for using a CES production
function, instead of the simpler Cobb-Douglas form, is that the elasticity of investment to
interest rates would be unrealistically high under the assumption of Cobb-Douglas technology.
Correspondingly, we assume that capital and labour tend to be less substitutable for each
other than in the Cobb-Douglas case (HARRISON et al., p. 34).
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with a coefficient of below unity, hence actual inflation would then
always be below expected inflation.
The length of the period for which this analysis is intended
then becomes significant. If the period is a calendar year, then causal
observation may suggest that all firms consider their prices at least
once a year, even if the decision is to leave their prices unchanged.
Hall, Walsh, and Yates (1997), in a survey of 654 UK companies, found
some 27 per cent of firms reviewed their prices annually, and all of
the others more frequently. Following the argument made in the
previous paragraph this would imply that the NKPC applied on an
annual basis would collapse as the coefficient on output (relative to
normal level) would be infinite. If in addition to the formal price
review we add in considerations of price adjustments, special
promotions etc., then the frequency of price changes would clearly
be increased, and may be such as to cast doubt on the usefulness of
the above approach for equations based on quarterly observations.
It can also be readily calculated from equation (6) that if typically
most firms (say 80 or 90 per cent) can their prices (or consider
changing their prices) in a given length of time (say a quarter of a
year) then the NPKC applied to that length of time period (in this
example on a quarterly basis) then the coefficient on deviation of
output from normal would become in some sense large: for α = 0.2,
coefficient is 32 λ (treating β ≈ 1), for α = 0.1 coefficient is 81λ.
An alternative derivation is provided in Harrison et al. (2005),
where the forward-looking profits function includes costs of price
adjustment, which are quadratic in firms own price change relative
to the steady state rate of inflation. Around the steady state rate of
inflation (p ) with linearization, and symmetry amongst firms, the rate
of inflation is given by:
(8)
where η is the elasticity of demand, RMC real marginal cost and χ
the parameter on the costs of price adjustment term in the profits
function. The term (η − 1/η) is simply the steady-state real marginal
cost, based on the equality of marginal cost and marginal revenue. It
can be again noted that RMC may be positively or negatively related
with output, and that inflation would be seen depend on factors such
as movement in the real wage which would impact on RMC. The
role of output here (which to repeat may be positive or negative)
comes from the relationship between actual mark-up of price over
(marginal) cost and the desired (profit maximising) mark-up of price
over (marginal) cost which are expressed in terms of real marginal cost
.SS
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(RMC) and the desired mark-up (the inverse of (η− 1)/η). However,
the approximations, which are used, serve to eliminate the effects of
changes in output. A simple representation of this line of argument
comes from the following. Consider that the desired (optimal) price
for a firm is given by:
(9)
where variables are measured in logs, and å is (log of) mark-up, w
wages and c(q), real marginal costs, which is made a function of
output. One approach to this would be to treat actual price changes
as a combination of changes in the optimal price and a catch-up
term depending on the difference between actual price and desired
price. Then price change would be given by:
(10)
which clearly involves changes in output. An alternative approach,
in effect pursued by the NKPC with staggered price changes, is the
following equation:
(11)
where inflation is seen to depend on output in a non-linear fashion,
and that inflation arises from attempts to move price to some desired
level.
Output enters equation (11) as a proxy for real marginal costs.
Real marginal costs are often empirically proxied by the share of
labour in national income. When labour is treated as the sole variable
factor of production, then (nominal) marginal cost is equal to wage
divided by marginal product of labour, and under a Cobb Douglas
production function marginal product of labour is equal to the
exponent of labour in the production function times the average
product of labour. Real marginal cost, that is nominal marginal cost,
is then proportional to labours share in national income. Inflation,
which is viewed as responsive to real marginal cost, could also be
viewed as inflation responsive to labours share. Further since share
of profits plus share of wages is equal to unity, this is also inflation
responsive to share of profits. This interpretation would feed into a
conflict theory of inflation since here prices are viewed to rise when
share of profits is below some normal or target level.
The NKPC has been criticised for its empirical failures. For example,
(MANKIW, 2001, p. C52) argues that [a]lthough the new Keynesian
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Phillips curve has many virtues, it also has one striking vice: It is
completely at odds with the facts. Chadha and Nolan (2004, p. 271)
concur by suggesting that [a]ttractive though the need to establish a
direct inflation-output link may be, as an empirical framework for
explaining inflation over the business cycle, the New Keynesian
Phillips Curve (NKPC), in inflation-output space has not been parti-
cularly successful. Galì and Gertler (1999, p. 196) have also noted
that it is often difficult to detect a statistically significant effect of real
activity on inflation using the structural formulation implied by the
theory, when the measure of real activity is an output gap (i.e., real
output relative to some measure of potential output). Failure to find
a significant short-run link between real activity and inflation is
unsettling for the basic story. For the UK, Batini et al. (2005, p. 1066), in
a paper on new Keynesian Phillips curve report, four core findings.
First, inflation appears to be highly forward-looking, with a coefficient
on expected inflation equal to 0.69 (t-value = 8.3). Second, as we
expected, the labour share term is strongly significant in this equation
entering with a coefficient of 0.16 (t-value = 4.9), which implies that
a 1 per cent rise in the share of labour gives rise to a 0.16 percentage
point increase in inflation. Third, additional cost elements, namely
real import prices and the change in oil prices, are also important.
Fourth, the employment terms are correctly signed and significant
in this equation, suggesting that employment adjustment costs are
relevant for pricing decisions and hence for inflation in the U.K. On
the other hand, in this baseline regression, both variables that cap-
ture variations in the equilibrium mark-up, i.e. the state of the business
cycle term and the term capturing the impact of foreign competition,
are not significant.
The evidence of authors such as Galí and Gertler (1999) and Galí
et al. (2005) suggests that real marginal cost (as measured by labour
share) is the appropriate variable to include rather than output,
which could be seen to also cast doubt on the output-marginal cost
link. Galí et al. (2005, p. 1109) argue that a significant corollary result
is that the use of real marginal cost as the relevant real sector forcing
variable in the hybrid NKPC (as the theory suggests) is critical to the
empirical success. Specifications based instead on ad-hoc output gap
measures (e.g., detrended log GDP) do not perform well: the
coefficient on the output variable is either insignificant or significant
but with the wrong sign. There has been of course considerable
criticism of the output-gap based NKPC (e.g., Mankiw, 2001). Our results
suggest that a key reason for the lack of success of this formulation is
that detrended output is not a good proxy for real marginal cost, in
addition to the need to allow for a modest amount of inertial behavior
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of inflation. An alternative interpretation of equation (2) then
becomes that inflation arises when labour share deviates from trend
value. Specifically when labours share is relatively high, the rate of
price inflation is relatively high, and firms could be seen as seeking
to restore their profit margins by raising prices (faster than otherwise).
Batini et al. (2005) discuss the new Keynesian Phillips curve. But
their key equation (3 in their paper and 12 in this paper) is of the
following form:
(12)
where pi is rate of inflation, ì is actual mark-up and ì* is target mark-
up, and n employment. This equation has three features: (I) coefficient
on expected inflation is not unity; (II) inflation is dependent on
difference between target and actual mark-up: mark-up is price/mar-
ginal cost, which is in effect the inverse of labour share (under Cobb-
Douglas production function assumption, which is later relaxed; (III)
changes in employment are relevant: indeed in this formulation it is
close to second difference of employment.
The NKPC then has the feature that the coefficient on expected
inflation is less than unity, albeit that the coefficient is relatively close
to unity (equation 6 above). If that is accepted then pit (1  β) = k (Yt 
Yt
n )with the implications that there is a long-run trade-off between
inflation and the output gap and the inflation target would imply a
non-zero output gap: indeed any constant rate of inflation would
imply (in general) a non-zero output gap.
The NCM (as indicated by equations (1) to (3) above) relies on
the Phillips curve as a central idea, where the Phillips curve has the
two properties of a (positive) relationship between the rate of inflation
and the level of economic activity, and a coefficient of unity on
expected inflation (coefficients on past and expected inflation sum
to zero). The argument advanced here is that the NKPC does not
support the second proposition, and we have argued does not
provide support to the first proposition either.
5 Final Considerations
The NCM has become associated with the use of monetary policy
to target inflation and with the downgrading of fiscal policy. In this
paper we have argued that the virtual dismissal of fiscal policy is not
well founded and based on a set of arbitrary assumptions. Further, if
allowance is made for some potency for fiscal policy then the central
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concept of the NCM in terms of the natural rate of interest is severely
undermined.
The use of interest rates to target inflation is based on two propo-
sitions. First, that there is a knowable and achievable equilibrium
real rate of interest (natural rate of interest) which is consistent with
constant inflation and supply-side equilibrium (zero output gap).
Second, that variations in the nominal policy interest rate influences
aggregate demand which in turn sets the rate of inflation. In this paper
we have argued that the natural rate of interest is a deficient concept
and there is no good reason to think that there is a well-defined
unique and achievable equilibrium rate of interest. We have further
argued that the Phillips curve on which the second proposition relies
is flawed on theoretical and empirical grounds, and specifically that
there is not a well-supported relationship between inflation and the
level of economic activity. We may, therefore, overall conclude that
the NCM is indeed an unreliable guide for policy.
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